First, from “Is Ontology Fundamental”:<\/p>\n
This tie to the other (person, autrui<\/em>), which does not reduce itself to the representation\u00a0of the Other (autrui<\/em>) but rather to his invocation, where invocation is not preceded by comprehension, we call religion. The essence of discourse is prayer. (7)<\/strong><\/p>\n TI 43<\/p>\n A\u00a0 calling\u00a0 into\u00a0 question of\u00a0 the\u00a0 same-which\u00a0 cannot\u00a0 occur\u00a0 within\u00a0 the\u00a0 egoist\u00a0 spontaneity\u00a0 of\u00a0 the same-is\u00a0 brought\u00a0 about\u00a0 by\u00a0 the\u00a0 other.\u00a0 We\u00a0 name\u00a0 this\u00a0 calling\u00a0 into\u00a0 ques tion\u00a0 of\u00a0 my\u00a0 spontaneity\u00a0 by\u00a0 the\u00a0 presence\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 Other\u00a0 ethics.\u00a0 The strangeness\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 Other,\u00a0 his\u00a0 irreducibility\u00a0 to\u00a0 the\u00a0 I,\u00a0 to\u00a0 my\u00a0 thoughts\u00a0 and my\u00a0 possessions,\u00a0 is\u00a0 precisely\u00a0 accomplished\u00a0 as\u00a0 a\u00a0 calling\u00a0 into\u00a0 question\u00a0 of my\u00a0 spontaneity, \u00a0as ethics.\u00a0 Metaphysics,\u00a0 transcendence,\u00a0 the\u00a0 welcoming\u00a0 of the\u00a0 other\u00a0 by\u00a0 the\u00a0 same,\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 Other\u00a0 by\u00a0 me,\u00a0 is\u00a0 concretely\u00a0 produced\u00a0 as\u00a0 the calling\u00a0 into\u00a0 question\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 same\u00a0 by\u00a0 the\u00a0 other,\u00a0 that\u00a0 is,\u00a0 as\u00a0 the\u00a0 ethics\u00a0 that accomplishes\u00a0 the\u00a0 critical\u00a0 essence\u00a0 of\u00a0 knowledge.\u00a0 And\u00a0 as\u00a0 critique\u00a0 precedes dogmatism,\u00a0 metaphysics\u00a0 precedes\u00a0 ontology. (43)<\/strong><\/p>\n TI 50-51<\/p>\n For the presence before a face, my orientation toward the Other<\/em>, can lose the avidity proper to the gaze only by turning into generosity, incapable of approaching the other with empty hands. This relationship established over the things henceforth possibly common, that is, susceptible of being said, is the relationship of conversation<\/em>. The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me<\/em>, we here name face<\/em>. This mode<\/em> does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum<\/em>–the adequate idea. It does not manifest itself by these qualities, but \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fbf \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78<\/em>. It expresses\u00a0<\/em>itself<\/em>. The face brings a notion of truth<\/em> which, in contradistinction to contemporary ontology, is not the disclosure of an impersonal Neuter, but expression<\/em>: the existent breaks through all the envelopings and generalities of Being to spread out in its “form” the totality of its “content,” finally abolishing the distinction between form and content. This is not achieved by some sort of modification of the knowledge that thematizes, but precisely by “thematization” turning into conversation. The condition for theoretical truth and error is the word of the other, his expression, which every lie already presupposes. But the first content of expression is the expression itself. To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive<\/em> from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity<\/em>. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching [enseignement<\/em>]. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics<\/em>; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent transitivity the very epiphany of the face <\/em>is produced. The Aristotelian analysis of the intellect, which discovers the agent intellect coming in by the gates, absolutely exterior, and yet constituting, nowise compromising, the sovereign activity of reason<\/em>, already substitutes for maieutics a transitive action of the master, since reason, without abdicating, is found to be in a position to receive<\/em>. (TI 50-51)<\/strong><\/p>\n Avital Ronell, Dictations<\/em>:<\/p>\n the experience of Conversation induces, once again, the vertigo of expropriation. It is not only the case that I am not identical to myself when I begin to converse with you, but more severely perhaps: you are no longer the one I have interiorized or memorized. Breaking the secret contract that sealed you within me, you, in Conversation, are no longer you, or the you at least of whom I have preserved an image.” (Dictations xii-xiii)<\/strong><\/p>\n TI 69:<\/p>\n The claim to know and to reach the other is realized in the relationship with the Other that is cast in the relation of language, where the essential is the interpellation, the vocative. The other is maintained and confirmed in his heterogeneity as soon as one calls upon him, be it only to say to him that one cannot speak to him, to classify him as sick, to announce to him his death sentence; at the same time as grasped, wounded, outraged, he is “respected.” The invoked is not what I comprehend: he is not under a category. He is the one to whom I speak\u2014he has only a reference to himself; he has no quiddity. (69)<\/strong><\/p>\n Lyotard, The Differend<\/em>, 110-11<\/p>\n The violence of the revelation is in the ego\u2019s expulsion from the addressor instance, from which it managed its work of enjoyment, power, and cognition. It is the scandal of an I displaced onto a you instance. The I turned you tries to repossess itself through the understanding of what dispossesses it. Another phrase is formed, in which the I returns in the addressor\u2019s situation, in order to legitimate or to reject\u2014it doesn\u2019t matter which\u2014the scandal of the other\u2019s phrase and of its own dispossession. This new phrase is always possible, like an inevitable temptation. But it cannot annul the event, it can only tame and master it, thereby disregarding the transcendence of the other. By turning the I into its you [toi<\/em>], the other makes him- or herself master, and turns the I<\/em> into his or her hostage. The other is not master, however, because he or she dominates the I<\/em>, but because he or she asks for the I<\/em> (D <\/em>111). (D <\/em>110\u201311)<\/strong><\/p>\n TI 198:<\/p>\n Murder still aims at a sensible datum, and yet it finds itself before a datum whose being cannot be suspended by an appropriation. It finds itself before a datum absolutely non-neutralizable. The “negation” effected by appropriation and usage remained always partial. The grasp that contests the independence of the thing preserves it “for me.” Neither the destruction of things, nor the hunt, nor the extermination of living beings aims at the face, which is not of the world<\/em>. They still belong to labor, have a finality, and answer to a need. Murder alone lays claim to total negation. Negation by labor and usage, like negation by representation, effect a grasp or a comprehension, rest on or aim at affirmation; they can. [Power] To kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what escapes <\/em>power. It is still a power, for the face expresses itself in the sensible, but already impotency, because the face rends the sensible. The alterity that is expressed in the face provides the unique “matter” possible for total negation. I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely, and therefore does not oppose them but paralyzes the very power of power. The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill. (198)<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" First, from “Is Ontology Fundamental”: This tie to the other (person, autrui), which does not reduce itself to the representation\u00a0of the Other (autrui) but rather to his invocation, where invocation is not preceded by comprehension, we call religion. The essence of discourse is prayer. (7) TI 43 A\u00a0 calling\u00a0 into\u00a0 question of\u00a0 the\u00a0 same-which\u00a0 cannot\u00a0 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":91,"featured_media":0,"parent":1755,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"nosidebar-page.php","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-1762","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1762","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/91"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1762"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1762\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2030,"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1762\/revisions\/2030"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1755"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.dwrl.utexas.edu\/davis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1762"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}